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Abstract 
To enable secure communication, pre-distributing keys to sensors in a grid based wireless sensor network has been efficient 
alternatives. In this paper, we propose a deterministic key predistribution scheme using symmetric bivariate polynomials as key 
pool in which each node stores four polynomial shares. The -secure property of -degree polynomial is exploited to achieve high 
resilience against both random and selective node capture. Also, a strategy to mount selective node capture on the proposed 
scheme is rendered. The proposed scheme is scalable and provides comparable connectivity with that of the existing schemes. 
Keywords: Key Predistribution;  Grid Based Wireless Sensor Network;  Symmetric Bivariate Polynomial; Selective Capture of Nodes;  
Transversal Designs 
1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a distributed, self-organizing network of low-powered, memory constrained,
inexpensive sensor nodes whose objective is to monitor the region over which it is deployed. Secure communication 
of data is a crucial issue which is enabled by employing cryptographic techniques. The inherent key agreement 
problem in these techniques has been addressed by devising several strategies. Amongst these, the failure of Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) and centralized trust server approaches have paved way for key pre-distribution techniques 
as an emerging research area, [1], for resolving the key agreement problem. Depending on the degree of control over 
location of sensors, Martin in [2] classifies Key Predistribution Schemes (KPS) for a WSN as: Uncontrolled, 
partially controlled and fully controlled. Eschenauer and Gligor, [3], pioneered the key agreement problem in an 
uncontrolled sensor network using random graphs. Several KPSs for this mode of deployment are discussed in [4-
11].  Imparting deployment knowledge information when devising a KPS can yield better performance in terms of 
connectivity, resilience, storage, communication and computation overhead, [12]. Key predistribution schemes 
proposed for such networks is based on the idea: if the probability of two nodes being located close to each other is 
high, then the probability of that they lie in each other’s communication range is also high. Hence, the probability 
that they share a cryptographic key should also be high. Schemes with such a motif for partially controlled network 
are dealt in [13-15].  Such schemes show high resilience, good connectivity for minimum number of keys but are 
complex in nature.  
In fully controlled grid based networks, it is assumed that the points of intersection are accessible and sensors 
may be placed at those positions with reasonable precision. Such a placement strategy has enormous applications 
ranging from military, like intrusion detection, to civilian, like monitoring vines in vineyard. In general, it is 
assumed that the sensing and transmission radii are same, known as Radio Frequency (RF) radius. Ruj et al. in [16, 
17] innovated a grid-based deployment KPS in a fully controlled environment, with square RF region and Lee
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distance approximation. They pre-distributed the keys using transversal designs,  where each node stores  
keys from a key pool of size . It provides good connectivity, low communication and computation overhead but 
suffers from limited scalability. It was also observed that the Lee distance approximation had slightly better 
resilience than square RF region approximation. Blackburn et al. proposed a scalable solution by modeling Distinct-
Difference Configurations (DDCs) for predistribution of keys in a square grid, with Lee distance RF region 
approximation, [12]. Given a specific radius  and maximum storage  available for a sensor, a DDC  is 
constructed using techniques given in [18]. Though this scheme offers connectivity similar to  scheme, one 
of the limitations of scheme is that all the key-sharing neighbors of a node is within the radius . In case a node 
having radius  gets disconnected (as its key-sharing neighbors could have been compromised), increasing its RF 
radius does not aid in establishing secure communication with other nodes. Furthermore, this scheme offers weaker 
resilience than  scheme, [17]. One of the main objectives of imparting deploying knowledge while design 
KPS is to render high resilience. Presently, these schemes for fully controlled grid network offer low resilience. For 
example, consider a grid of size  in which each node stores 15 keys with RF radius, . Compromise of 
 nodes in a  scheme affects more than 20% of the total number of links. 
In this paper, we consider a homogenous fully controlled sensor network, i.e. all nodes have equal capability, 
deployed on a square grid with square RF region approximation.  With an objective to provide higher resilience than 
the existing schemes, a scalable deterministic KPS using symmetric bivariate polynomial key pool is proposed. The 
connectivity of each node is established and a strategy to selectively capture nodes for proposed scheme is shown. 
Also, a theoretical upper bound on its resilience against random node capture is presented and is supported through 
experimental results. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The proposed scheme is presented in section 2. 
The connectivity of each node is provided in section 3 and the resilience of the proposed scheme under selective and 
random node capture pattern is furnished in section 4. Finally, we conclude in section 5 and discuss our future work. 
2. Proposed Scheme 
As exemplified above, the existing grid based schemes in [12, 16] renders large number of uncompromised links 
insecure on capture of very few nodes. To improve resilience, we exploiting the -secure property of a polynomial 
with degree , [19]: if the nodes captured by an adversary has  or lesser shares of a polynomial , then all the 
uncompromised links formed by  is secure; but if  or more shares of the polynomial is captured, then 
the adversary can interpolate to reconstruct  and hence, learn all the keys. 
2.1. Key Distribution 
Key distribution phase commences with the KMA generating a total of  symmetric bivariate 
polynomials of degree  over a finite field  where  is a prime power, ,  is the number of nodes. These 
polynomials constitute the key pool known as polynomial key pool, , [5]. Let  be the node located at  in the 
grid. The polynomials are partitioned into four different types: row, column, left diagonal and right diagonal. The 
different polynomials along with set of nodes sharing these polynomials are enumerated below: 
1. Row polynomials, , is shared by nodes , i.e., by nodes located in row . Here, 
 and hence, there are  such polynomials. 
2. Column polynomials, , is shared by nodes  i.e., by nodes located in column . Here, 
 and hence there are  such polynomials. 
3. Left diagonal polynomials are denoted by  where  is the starting location of the polynomial. 
Generally,  is either of the form   or , where  and . Such 
polynomials are shared by nodes  , where 
 
4. Right diagonal polynomials are denoted by  where  is the starting location of the polynomial. 
Generally,  is either of the form  or , where  and . Such 
polynomials are shared by nodes located at , where  
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Figure 1 depicts the assignment of polynomial shares to each node. To make the figure presentable, the 
polynomials  is abbreviated as  where  
During the generation of these polynomials, the KMA assigns unique IDs for each of polynomial as follows: 
1. For each row polynomial, , assign its unique ID as , where  is the binary representation of  of length 
. Repeat this process for column polynomials also. 
2. For each left diagonal polynomial,  , assign an unique value for , and let  is the 
binary representation of a unique  of length .  
 
Figure 1: The proposed KPS on a  grid where the nodes are placed at the intersection of every row and column. 
3. For each right diagonal polynomial , assign an unique value for , and let  is the 
binary representation of a unique  of length .  
 
For a node, , which has to posses the polynomial share of the polynomials with ids  is given a 
unique ID as, , where  is used to represent the concatenation of binary strings. Hence, the 
total memory required for a node to store its ID is . On assigning a unique ID to each 
node, KMA then assigns the polynomial shares ,  
to each node  where  and  correspond to the unique values  and  respectively. It can be seen 
that the proposed scheme is highly scalable, since if new nodes are to be added, depending on their position in the 
grid network, they can be given the corresponding polynomial shares. Since each node stores 4 polynomial shares, 
the proposed KPS is known as Quadruplex Polynomial Shares per Node (QPSN) scheme. 
After assigning the corresponding polynomial shares to all the  sensor nodes, they are transported to the 
surveillant environment and distributed in accordance with the predetermined locations. 
2.2. Share Key Discovery Phase 
On deploying the nodes in the surveillant environment, they trigger the shared key discovery phase. This phase 
assists in ascertaining each node’s key-sharing neighbors. In this phase, each node broadcasts its node IDs to its 
physical neighbors in its RF radius, ρ. As square RF region is consider, the physical neighbors of a node  is the 
set of all nodes which are encompassed by a square region of dimension  centered at . On the receiving 
end, each node partitions the node ID into four parts:  of size  bits,  bits,  
bits,  bits respectively, in this order. Partitioning is followed by comparing it with its corresponding 
polynomials ids. If a match occurs, the corresponding polynomial is used to generate the secret key. If  is the ID of 
the matched polynomial, then the receiving node  calculates the key  by substituting 
 in its polynomial share. Similarly the source node  computes the key  by 
substituting  in its polynomial share, where  is the type of the matched polynomial. It can be observed that 
a secure link is created due to the polynomial shares of at most one polynomial.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
V. Sridhar and V. Raghavendar / Procedia Computer Science 5 (2011) 132–140 135
In the process, communication incurs an overhead of  bits, where 
. The computational complexity is incurred during the polynomial evaluation to derive the secret key. Such 
an evaluation involves  modular multiplications and  modular additions over finite field . The inputs for the 
polynomials, the node IDs, are of size approximately . Since, modular multiplication contributes 
maximum to the complexity, the computation complexity is .  scheme requires 
 bits for communication and  computational complexity where  is prime power. The 
communication and computation complexity of QPSN scheme, though efficient, is not better than that for . 
Let us now evaluate the performance of QPSN scheme using some standard performance indicators. 
3.  Key Connectivity 
Key connectivity evaluates the scheme by furnishing the probability that two nodes are connected. Adopting the 
technique in [16], the local connectivity of a node  can be computed as,  where,  is the set of key-
sharing neighbors of  and  is the set of physical neighbors of . In the same paper, the authors have shown 
that, for any node ,  and in particular, for 
an interior node , .  
3.1. Determining the exact value of  for the proposed scheme 
The following theorem determines the number of key-sharing neighbors of  i.e.,  when . 
Theorem 1: In a   grid, on employing the QPSN scheme, the number of key-sharing nodes for a node  
having RF radius , is given by 
 
The total number of secure links in the network is given by . 
Proof. Let,  for any point  in the grid. Any node sharing a key with 
node  must lie in any one of the straight path connecting location  to .  Let  be called a valid 
location if the point  lies within the grid.  
 
Figure 2: The key-sharing neighbours of node  with radius Ǥ
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Since every node has a radius , there is exactly  nodes on the straight path connecting  with a valid location in 
. Figure 2 projects the location of such nodes for node a . We shall now prove the theorem by considering all 
the cases individually. 
Case 1: . 
In this case, all the locations in  are valid locations. There is a total of  nodes in the straight path from  to 
 including . Here, , giving a total of  key-sharing nodes. 
Case 2: . 
It has been assumed that  and hence,  is a valid location. Therefore, all the locations in the set 
 are valid locations.  with , there are  key-sharing neighbors. Since 
 is not a valid location,  can share keys only with nodes  where  and 
. Hence, for each of the remaining 3 cases, there is  nodes with which  shares a key. 
Case 3: . 
As discussed in earlier case, since ,  is a valid location. Therefore, all the locations in the set 
 are valid locations. Again,  with  and hence there are  key-sharing 
neighbors. Since  is not a valid location,  can share keys only with nodes  where 
 and . Hence, for the remaining 3 cases, there is  nodes with which  shares a key. 
Case 4:  : Proof similar to case 2 
Case 5:  : Proof similar to case 3 
Case 6:  
Again, as ,  and  is a valid location. Consequently, all the locations in the set 
 are valid locations with . Hence, there are  nodes which shares a key with . Furthermore, 
there are  valid locations in the straight path from  to  and . Likewise, in each of the 
straight path from  to  and  there are  valid locations. It can also be observed that there 
is a total of  valid locations in the straight path from  to . 
Similar to the proof for case 6, the remaining cases can be proved. Hence, we have obtained the total number of 
key-sharing neighbors for a node . The corresponding key-sharing graph, [1], consists of vertices representing 
the nodes and an edge which denotes a secured link i.e., the two nodes share a key. The degree of each vertex,  is 
. By handshaking lemma [20], the total number of edges/links in the network is, .           ז 
 
Table 1 illustrates the connectivity ratio of the QPSN scheme and the  scheme for an interior node as RF 
radius varies. It can be seen that the proposed QPSN scheme performs better than the  scheme. In both the 
schemes, the proportion of nodes to which an interior node is connected diminishes as  increases, the decrease in 
the  scheme is much more than the former. But, it has also been observed that, increasing the size of the key 
chain improves the connectivity of the  scheme while it has no effect on QPSN scheme’s connectivity.
Table 1: Connectivity ratio  for interior nodes with change in RF radius, for a 47 47 grid with 7 keys per node, for different schemes. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
QPSN         
4. Resilience against Capture of Nodes 
The environment, in which the sensors are deployed, is susceptible to capture of nodes by adversary. As the 
sensors are not tamper resistant, on compromise of a node, all the cryptographic keys it possesses are exposed. An 
immediate consequence is that all the communication channels which uses any of those keys become insecure. The 
metric which quantifies the damage caused by the exposure of keys, , is defined as given in [7],  
  
Generally, it is assumed that the adversary is powerful enough to eavesdrop on any communication channel in the 
grid network and also possesses infinite resources in terms of software, hardware and computation power. Being so 
powerful, there are two types of capture patterns which the adversary can follow.  
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1. Selective capture of nodes – In this type of attack, the adversary wisely captures a small set of nodes to expose all 
the keys from the key pool. Generally, such an attack exploits the manner in which the keys are distributed to the 
nodes. In this case, . 
2. Random capture of nodes – In this type of attack, the adversary does not follow any specific methodology to 
capture nodes i.e., it is random. 
We shall analyze the resilience of the proposed scheme under these two types of attacks. 
4.1. Selective Capture of Nodes 
To reveal all the keys from the key pool of  scheme, the attacker only has to remove all the nodes from 
any one of the rows. Hence, for a grid of dimension  (  is a prime power), the proportion of nodes to be 
removed under such an attack is,  
 
In this section, the total number of nodes to be removed and guidelines on which nodes are to be removed to 
successfully mount this attack on the proposed QPSN scheme is discussed and a comparative study is tabulated.  
Consider a grid of dimension . For such a grid, the proposed scheme generates  polynomial of 
degree . To completely reveal all the keys from the key pool, the adversary must capture nodes such that the 
complete polynomial key pool can be reconstructed. Due to the -secure property of each polynomial, the captured 
nodes must contain  polynomial shares of all the polynomials. It must be noted that for polynomials which are 
shared by less than  nodes, all the nodes sharing the polynomial must be captured to reveal the pair-wise keys. 
The steps to be followed, along with the explanation of how many polynomials, are given below. 
1. Capture nodes  where  and . At the end of this step,  shares of the following 
polynomials is exposed: 
i. All the  row polynomials. 
ii. Since ,   column polynomials , . 
iii.  left diagonal polynomials .  
iv.  right diagonal polynomials . 
Hence, the capture of these  nodes renders all the links corresponding to  polynomials 
insecure. 
2. Capture nodes  where  and . At the end of this step,  shares of the following 
polynomials is revealed: 
i. Remaining  column polynomials .  
ii. Remaining  left diagonal polynomials .  
At the end of these two steps, one can observe that  shares of the right diagonal polynomials, , 
 are also known to the adversary. Therefore, for , at least  shares of the right 
diagonal polynomial are exposed. Summing up, a total of  polynomials would have been 
exposed by the capture of . Only right diagonal polynomials are remaining to be revealed.  
3. For every right diagonal polynomials , capture  nodes possessing 
the corresponding polynomial share. Therefore, a total of  nodes are capture in 
the process. At the end of this step,  right diagonal polynomials  have been compromised. 
4. It can be observed that each of   is distributed among  or lesser nodes. Hence, 
all the nodes sharing any one of these polynomials have to be captured to gain knowledge of the pair-wise keys 
used amongst nodes having any of these polynomials. This leads to two cases, 
i. If  , then the polynomials remaining to be captured has less than or equal to  nodes. 
Hence all these must be compromised to obtain the secret key which each of nodes uses to communicate 
securely. This involves capturing  nodes.  
ii. Else if , then there exists uncompromised right diagonal polynomials which have more 
than  nodes. Hence,  nodes having the polynomial shares . Since each 
node have can have at most one right diagonal polynomial share, the number of nodes captured is 
. As discussed above, in this case, the polynomials , 
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necessitates all the nodes having polynomial shares of these polynomials must be compromised. In this 
process, the adversary captures  additional nodes. 
Hence, at the end of this step, all the polynomials from the polynomial key pool are compromised. The total 
number of nodes to be compromised to reveal the entire key pool is given by, 
 
Therefore, the proportion of nodes to be removed to successfully mount this on the QPSN scheme is, . 
The following table compares the resilience of the proposed QPSN scheme with  scheme for some grid 
networks. Here  and  is the number of keys stored in each node of the  scheme. The value of  is taken 
such that .  
From Table 2, it can be seen that the proposed scheme provides significantly higher resilience against this attack 
than the  scheme, for nearly the same amount of memory utilized for keys. It should also be noted that, for 
the same grid network a small increase in  (and hence, memory requirement increases) improves the resilience 
drastically. Furthermore, for the proposed scheme, the attacker has to compromise nodes from large portions of the 
grid whilst in  scheme the nodes have to be compromised from a small portion of the grid. 
Table 2: Comparative study of resilience against selective node capture between  and the QPSN scheme for different grid networks. 
Parameter 
     
     
QPSN     
4.2. Random Capture of Nodes 
As stated earlier, in this pattern of attack, the adversary captures the nodes one after another at random. In this 
process, if the adversary is successful in compromising  polynomial shares of any polynomial, then all the links 
formed using this polynomial becomes insecure. Since it is very difficult to determine the exact value of , 
degree of damage caused by capture of  nodes, a theoretical upper bound for  is derived.  
Let  denote the number of links exposed on compromise of  nodes and  be the total number of links before 
compromise of  nodes. Therefore,  , where  is computed from Theorem 1.  depends on the number of 
polynomials compromised and the number of links broken due to every compromised polynomial. Since an exact 
value for  is known, determining the upper bound for  reduces to the determining the upper bound for .  
4.2.1. Derivation for  
The following theorem on the number of secured links formed by a polynomial is useful in determining the upper 
bound for . 
Theorem 2. Let  be any polynomial from the polynomial key pool  which is shared by  nodes. If  is the radius, 
then the number of links formed due to the polynomial  is given by, 
 
Proof. Let  be the nodes possessing the polynomial shares of the polynomial , with nodes  and  
lying on the sides of the  square grid (i.e., the end points) and  is a physically one hop away from   and 
. Since every node has a radius ,  can establish links with  using the 
polynomial share corresponding to the polynomial . Hence,  has  key-sharing neighbors i.e., its degree in the 
key-sharing graph for polynomial , thus constructed is . Similarly,  also has degree . Likewise,  and  
have degree  each. Continuing in this manner, nodes  and  has degree of  each. The remaining 
middle  nodes have a degree of  each.  By handshaking lemma, the total number of edges/links is given by, 
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   ז
 
Let   be a set of compromised polynomials. .  It can be observed that the maximum 
number of nodes which can share a polynomial is . .  
 
Generally, it is assumed that only a small number of nodes are captured. Hence, we assume that  and 
adopt the selective capture of nodes strategy to derive a tight upper bound on . As large number of polynomials 
is revealed on capturing very small number of nodes, the selective capture of nodes strategy, described in section 
4.1, is pursued. Since , in the worst case, the attacker will execute the first step of the procedure 
resulting in the exposure of large number of polynomials in the network. Since the strategy is well-defined and 
simple, we present the following theorem, without proof, to furnish the maximum value on .  
Theorem 3. If  number of nodes are captured at random, where  and . Following the 
selective capture of nodes strategy, then the number of nodes captured is given by, 
 
 
 
Now, it is possible to give a theoretical upper bound for  where  and  can be 
determined by Theorem 3 and 2 respectively, and  where  is given by Theorem 1. 
Table 3 illustrates the comparative study of the resilience of the proposed scheme with the  scheme 
against random capture of nodes. The practical values for  scheme, with square RF region,  and for 
Lee distance approximation,  has been extracted from Table 2 of paper in [17]. Experimental values are 
obtained by taking average for 100 runs. 
Table 3: Resilience against random node capture between the proposed scheme and   scheme for different network sizes.  
          
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
When , the proposed QPSN scheme offered very high resilience (and hence, insignificant values for 
) against this attack. Hence, higher number of compromised nodes is considered to tabulate the resilience of the 
proposed scheme,  From Table 3, it can be inferred that the resilience, against random node capture, of 
proposed scheme clearly outperforms that of  scheme. For a  grid network, removal of just 10 
nodes disrupts 17% of the network links in the  scheme whilst even after the removal of 500 nodes from the 
same grid network; only 13% of the links are only broken in the proposed scheme. Furthermore, on increasing the 
memory storage in both the schemes marginally, the proposed QPSN scheme exhibits drastic improvement in its 
resilience in comparison with the  scheme. Overall, the proposed scheme offers better resilience against any 
form of attack than the  scheme on a grid based wireless sensor network.  
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
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In this paper, a scalable KPS has been proposed using symmetric bivariate polynomial key pool with an objective 
to improve resilience. Each node stores four polynomial shares and an efficient shared key discovery phase is 
devised. Also, the number of key-sharing neighbors of all nodes, the number of nodes to be selectively captured to 
reveal the key pool, and a theoretical upper bound for the resilience against random node capture has been 
mathematically proven. Experimental results demonstrate the supremacy of this scheme over the existing schemes. 
There are several directions for future work. Amidst the fact that the proposed scheme assures 2-hop 
connectivity, 1-hop connectivity is low. Moreover, as the expression is dependent only on , increasing the storage 
does not aid in improving the connectivity. We would like to work towards incorporating additional features to the 
design which enables better connectivity. Mounting the selective capture of nodes attack on the  scheme 
and evaluating its resilience is another study of interest. 
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